This has led me to the following interpretation of the quantum theory of the physical universe itself. Projecting a universe of objects in a low dimensional space, e.g., 3 dimensions, up into higher dimensional spaces, causes the average distance between objects to increase exponentially with the number of dimensions. (The same is true of sparse distributed codes living in a sparse distributed code space.) But now imagine that the objects in the low dimensional space are not point masses, but rather have extension. Specifically, let’s imagine that these objects are something like ball-and-stick lattices, or 3D graphs consisting of edges and nodes. The graph has extension in 3 dimensions, but is mostly just space. Further, imagine that the graph edges simply represent forces between the nodes (and not constrained to be pairwise forces), where the nodes are the actual material constituents of objects (similar to how an atom is mostly space…and perhaps even a proton is mostly empty space).

Now suppose that the actual universe is of huge dimension, e.g., a million dimensions, or an Avogadro’s number of dimensions, but let’s stick with one million for simplicity. Furthermore, imagine that these are all macroscopic dimensions (as opposed to the Planck-scale rolled up dimensions of string theory). Now imagine that this million-D universe is filled with macroscopic “graph” objects. They would have macroscopic extent on perhaps a large fraction or even all of those 1 million dimensions, but they would be almost infinitely sparse or diffuse, i.e., ghost-like, so diffuse that numerous, perhaps exponentially numerous such objects, could exist in physical superposition with each other, i.e., physically intermingled. They could easily pass through each other. But, as they did so, they would physically interact.

Suppose that we can consider two graphs to be similar in proportion to how many nodes they share in common. Thus two graphs that had a high fraction of their nodes in common might represent two similar states of the same object.

But suppose that instead of thinking of a single graph as representing a single object, we think of it as representing a collection of objects. In this case, two graphs having a certain set of nodes in common (intersection), could be considered to represent similar world states in which some of the same objects are present and perhaps where some of the those objects have similar internal states and some of the inter-object relations are similar. Suppose that such a graph, S, consisted of a very large number (e.g., millions) of nodes and that a tiny subset, for concreteness, say, 1000, of those nodes corresponded to the presence of some particular object *x*. Then imagine another instance of the overall graph, S’, in which 990 of those nodes are present. We could imagine that that might represent another state of reality in which *x* manifests almost identically as it did in the original instance; call that version of *x*, *x*‘. Thus, if S was present, and thus if *x* was present, we could say that *x*‘ is also *physically* present, just with 990/1000 strength rather than with full strength. In other words, the two states of reality can be said to be physically present, just with varying strength. Clearly, there are an exponential number of states around *x* that could also be said to be partially physically present.

Thus we can imagine that the actual physical reality that we experience at each instant is a physical superposition of an exponentially large number of possible states, where that superposition, or world state, corresponds to an extremely diffuse graph, consisting of a very large number of nodes, living in a universe of vastly high dimension.

** This constitutes a fundamentally new interpretation of physical reality **in which, in contrast to Hugh Everett’s “many worlds” theory, there is

Imagine projecting this 1 million dimensional space down into 3 dimensions. These “object-graphs”, which are exponentially diffuse in the original space, will appear dense in the low dimensional manifold. Specifically, the density of such objects increases exponentially with decreasing number of dimensions. I submit that what we experience (perceive) as physical reality is simply an extremely low dimensional, e.g. 3 or 4 dimensions, projection of a hugely-high dimensional universe, whose objects are macroscopic but extremely diffuse. Note that these graphs (or arbitrary portions thereof) can have rigid structure (due to the forces amongst the nodes).

In particular, this new theory obviates the need for the exponentially large number of physically separate universes that Everett’s theory requires. Any human easily understands the massive increase in space in going from 1-D to 2-D or from 2-D to 3-D. There is nothing esoteric or spooky about it. Anyone can also understand how this generalizes to adding an arbitrary number of dimensions. In contrast, I submit that no human, including Everett, could offer a coherent explanation of what it means to have multiple, physically separate universes. We already have the concept, which we are all easily taught in childhood, that the “universe” is all there is. There is no Physical room for any additional universes. The “multiverse”—a hypothesized huge or infinite set of physical universes—is simply an abuse of language.

Copenhagen maintains that all possible physical states exist in superposition at once and that when we observe reality, that superposition collapses to one state. But Copenhagen never provided an intuitive physical explanation for this quantum superposition. **What Copenhagen simply does not explain, and what Everett solves by positing an exponential number of physically separate, low-dimensional universes, filled with dense, low-D objects, I solve by positing a single super-high dimensional universe filled with super-diffuse, high-D objects.**

Slightly as an aside, this new theory helps resolve a problem I’ve always had with Schrodinger’s cat. The two states, “cat alive” and “cat dead” are constructed to seem very different. This misleads people into thinking that at every instant and in every physical subsystem, a veritable infinity of states coexist in superposition. I mean…why stop at just “cat alive” and “cat dead”? What about the state in which a toaster has appeared, or a small nuclear-powered satellite? I suppose it is possible that some vortex of physical forces, perhaps designed by a supercomputer, could instantly rearrange all the atoms in the box from one in which there was a live cat to one in which there is the toaster, or the satellite. But I think it is better to think of transformations like this to have zero probability. My point here is that the number of physical states to which any physical subsystem might collapse at any given moment, i.e., the cardinality of the superposition that exists at that moment, is actually vastly smaller than one might naively think having been misled by the typical exposition of Schrodinger’s cat. Thus, it perhaps becomes more plausible that my theory can accommodate the number of physical states that actually do coexist in superposition.

Again, this theory of what physical reality actually is came to me by first understanding and constructing a similar theory about representing physical reality. In that SDC theory, the universe is a high-D “codespace”, the “objects” are “representations” or “codes”, and these codes are high-D but are extremely diffuse (sparse) in that codespace.

]]>On the other hand, if concepts are represented using *sparse distributed codes* (SDCs), i.e., *sets* of co-active units chosen from a much larger total field of units, where the sets may intersect to arbitrary degrees, then it becomes possible to measure similarity (inverse distance) as the size of intersection between codes. Note that in this case, the representations (the SDCs) fundamentally have extension…they are not formally equivalent to point masses. Thus, there is no longer any need for an *external* coordinate system to hold these representations. A similarity metric is automatically imposed on the set of represented concepts by the patterns of intersections of their codes. I’ll call this an *internal* similarity metric.

*Crucially, unlike the case for localist codes, creating a new SDC code (i.e., choosing a set of units to represent a new concept), DOES compute and store the similarities of the new concept to ALL stored concepts. No explicit computation, and thus no additional computational time or power, is needed beyond the act of choosing/storing the SDC itself.*

Consider the toy example below. Here, the format is that all codes will consist of exactly 6 units chosen from the field. Suppose the system has assigned the set of red cells to be the code for the concept, “Cat”. If the system then assigns the yellow cells to be the code for “Dog”, then in the act of choosing those cells, the fact that three of the units (orange) are shared by the code for “Cat” implicitly represents (reifies in structure) a particular similarity measure of “cat” and “Dog”. If the system later assigns the blue cells to represent “Fish”, then in so doing, it simultaneously reifies in structure particular measures of similarity to both “Cat” and “Dog”, or in general, to ** ALL** concepts previously stored. No additional computation was done, beyond the choosing of the codes themselves, in order to embed ALL similarity relations, not just the pairwise ones,

This is why I talk about SDC as the coming revolution in computation. Computing the similarities of things is in some sense the essential operation that intelligent computers perform. Twenty years ago, I demonstrated, in the form of the constructive proof that is my model TEMECOR, now Sparsey®, that choosing an SDC for a new input, which respects the similarity structure of the input space, can be done in fixed time (i.e., the number of steps, thus the compute time and power, remains constant as additional items are added). *In light of the above example, this implies that an SDC system computes an exponential number of similarity relations (of all orders) and reifies them in structure also in fixed-time.*

Now, what about the possibility of using localist codes, but not simply placed in an N-space, but stored in a tree structure? Yes. This is, I would think, essentially how all modern databases are designed. The underlying information, the fields of the records, are stored in localist fashion, and some number *E* of external tree indexes are constructed and point into the records. Each individual tree index allows finding the best-matching item in the database in log time, but only with respect to the particular query represented by that index. When a new item is added to the database all *E* indexes must execute their insertion operations independently. In the terms used above, each index computes the similarity relations of a new item to ALL *N* stored items and reifies them using only log*N* comparisons. However, the similarities are only those specific to the manifold (subspace) corresponding to index (query). The total number of similarity relations computed is the sum across the *E* indexes, as opposed to the product. But it is not this sheer quantitative difference, but rather that having predefined indexes precludes reification of almost all of the similarity relations that in fact may exist and be relevant in the input space.

Thus I claim that SDC admits computing similarity relations exponentially more efficiently than localist coding, even localist codes augmented by external tree indexes. And, that’s at the heart of why in the future, all intelligent computation will be physically realized via SDC….and why that computation will be able to be done as quickly and power-efficiently as in the brain.

]]>A *localist* representation is one in which each item of information (“concept”) stored in the system, e.g., the concept, ‘my car’, is represented by a single, atomic unit, and that physical unit is disjoint from the representations of all other concepts in the system. We can consider that atomic representational unit to be a *word* of memory, say 32 or 64 bits. No other concept, of any scale, represented in the database can use that physical word (representational unit). Consequently, that single representational unit can be considered *the* physical representation of my car (since all of the information stored in the database, which together constitutes the full concept of ‘my car’, is reachable via that single unit). This meets the definition of a localist representation…the representations of the concepts are physically disjoint.

In contrast to *localism*, we could devise a scheme in which each concept is represented by a subset of the full set of physical units comprising the system, or more specifically, comprising the system’s memory. For example, if the memory consisted of 1 billion physical bits, we could devise a scheme in which the concept, ‘my car’, might be represented by a particular subset of, say, 10,000 of those 1 billion bits. In this case, if the concept ‘my car’ was active in that memory, that set of 10,000 bits, and only that particular subset, would be active.

What if some other concept, say, ‘my motorcycle’, needs to become active? Would some other subset of 10,000 bits that is completely disjoint from the 10,000 bits representing my car, become active? No. If our system was designed this way, it would again be a localist representation (since we’d be requiring the representations of distinct concepts to be physically disjoint). Instead, we could allow the 10,000 bits that represent my motorcycle to share perhaps 5,000 bits in common with my car’s representation. The two representations are still unique. After all, they each have 5,000 bits—half their overall representations—not in common with each other. But the atomic representational units, bits, can now be shared by multiple concepts, i.e., representations can physically overlap. Such a representation in which a) each concept is represented by a small subset of the total pool of representational units and b) those subsets can intersect, is called a *sparse distributed code *(S*DC)*.

With these definitions in mind, it is crucial (for the computer industry) to realize that to date, virtually all information stored electronically on earth, e.g., all information stored in fields of records of databases, is represented *localistically*. Equivalently, to date there has been virtually no commercial use of SDC on earth. Moreover, only a handful of scientists have thus far understood the importance of SDC, Kanerva (~1988), Rachkovskij & Kussul (late 90’s), myself (early 90’s, Thesis 1996), Hecht-Nielsen (~2000), Numenta (~2009), and a few others. Only in the past year or so, have the first few attempts at commercialization begun to appear, e.g., Numenta. Thus, two things:

- The computer industry may want to at least consider (due diligence) that SDC may be the next major, i.e., once-in-a-century, paradigm shift
- it could be that SDC = QC

With SDC, it becomes possible for those 5,000 bits that the two representations (‘my car’ and ‘my motorcycle’) have in common to represent features (sub-concepts) that are common to both my car and my motorcycle. In other words, *similarity in the space of represented concepts can be represented by physical overlap of the representations of those concepts*. This is something that cannot be achieved with a localist representation (because localist representations don’t overlap). And from one vantage point, it is the reason why SDC is so superior to localist coding, in fact, exponentially superior to localist coding.

But, the deep (in fact, identity) connection of SDC and QC is not that more similar concepts will have larger intersections. Rather it is that if all representable (by a particular memory/system) concepts are represented by subsets of an overall pool of units and if those subsets can overlap, then any single concept. i.e., any single subset, can be viewed as, and can function as, a *probability (or likelihood) distribution over ALL representable concepts*. We’ll just use “probability”. That is, any given active representation represents all representable hypotheses in *superposition*. And if the model has enforced that similar concepts are assigned to more highly overlapping codes, then the *probability* of any particular concept at a given moment is the *fraction* of that concept’s bits that are active in the currently (fully) active code (making the reasonable assumption that for *natural* worlds, the probabilities of two concepts should correlate with their similarities).

This has the following hugely important consequence. If there exists an algorithm that updates the probability of the currently active *single* concept in *fixed* time, i.e., in computational time that remains constant over the life of the system (more specifically, remains constant as more and more concepts are stored in the memory), then that algorithm can also be viewed as updating the probabilities of *all representable concepts* in fixed time. If the number of concepts representable is of exponential order (i.e. exponential in the number of representational units), then we have a system which updates an exponential number of concepts, more specifically, an exponential number of probabilities of concepts (hypotheses), in fixed time. Expressed at this level of generality, this meets the definition of QC.

All that remains to do in order to demonstrate QC is to show that the aforementioned fixed time operation that maps one active SDC into the next—or equivalently, that maps one active probability distribution into the next—changes the probabilities of all representable concepts in a sensible way, i.e., in a way that accurately models the space of representable concepts (i.e., accurately models the semantics, or the dynamics, or the statistics, of that space). In fact, such a fixed time operation has existed for some time (since about 1996). It is the Sparsey® model (formerly TEMECOR, and see thesis at pubs). And, in fact, the reason why the updates to the probability distribution (i.e., to the superposition) can be sensible is that is, as suggested above, that similarity of concepts can be represented by degree of intersection (overlap) of their SDCs.

I realize that this view, that SDC is identically QC, flies in the face of dogma, where dogma can be boiled down to the phrase “there is no classical analog of quantum superposition”. But I’m quite sure that the mental block underlying this dogma for so long has simply been that that quantum scientists have been thinking in terms of localist representations. I predict that it will become quite clear in the near future that SDC constitutes a completely plausible classical analog of quantum superposition.

..more to come, e.g., entanglement is easily and clearly explained in terms of SDC…

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